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I. Introduction
Public health agencies undertake a broad range of 
health promotion and injury and disease prevention 
activities in collaboration with an array of actors, such 
as the community, businesses, and non-proﬁt organi-
zations. These activities are “multisectoral” in nature 
and centered on public health agencies that oversee 
and engage with the other actors.1 Public health agen-
cies can inﬂuence the hazardous activities in the private 
sector in a variety of ways, “ranging from prohibition 
and regulation to volunteerism, and from coopera-
tion to cooption.”2 Hence, a public health agency that 
possesses the necessary administrative resources and 
authority is vital to the effective implementation of 
health policies and regulations.3
In the developing world, however, many state health 
agencies lack these basic capacities in dealing with 
critical health threats, including their ability to avert 
epidemics of communicable diseases arising from 
poor sanitary conditions. A serious constraint is the 
shortage of public health funding for health agencies 
in the developing world for typical agency functions 
(e.g., surveillance, monitoring, assessment, and inter-
vention). This is often aggravated by the transaction-
intensive demands entailed in enforcing regulations 
among an array of private and public sector actors 
including individuals, businesses, and local bodies 
responsible for providing civic services. This combina-
tion of constraints makes it difficult for agencies to use 
their limited funding and personnel to meet compel-
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ling public health needs such as assuring sanitation, 
nuisance abatement, occupational health and safety, 
and infectious disease control. 
Another problem arises from the fact that public 
health agencies can be quite dependent on the judicial 
system to enforce compliance with health violations 
through the threat of civil litigation or criminal convic-
tion. Litigation is an expensive process — even in the 
developed world. The U.S. faces caseloads that often 
dissuade prosecutors from pursuing all but the most 
serious crimes. In such an atmosphere, public health 
offenses are seen as small, and food and drug ﬁrms 
are wealthy and willing to expend resources to defend 
themselves.4 The expense of litigation can be onerous 
for developing country public health budgets. 
The problem is further compounded by the slow 
and erratic judicial systems of some developing coun-
tries. These legal systems, in effect, do not constitute 
a credible threat for individuals and businesses that 
create health hazards and violate public health norms. 
In Nigeria, for example, there is a limited number of 
government officials with legal training and they are 
overburdened by non-health related cases (ranging 
from large-scale corruption to political vote-rigging 
scandals to murders by public vigilantes).5 Hence, 
public health violations are generally given a lower 
priority by government prosecutors. In addition, the 
tendency of the government to delay the payment of 
salaries to judicial officials leaves them vulnerable to 
corporate bribery.6 
There are clearly many reasons to look beyond con-
ventional litigation, and consider other approaches to 
regulation, which can offer insights into how developing 
countries with limited resources, limited administra-
tive capacity, and slow judicial systems can implement 
public health regulations and standards. This article 
explores several modiﬁed and alternative implemen-
tation mechanisms being utilized in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries. Section II reviews the traditional regulatory 
powers possessed by public health agencies in OECD 
countries in the governance of persons and businesses. 
Section III discusses traditional approaches to regula-
tory implementation. Section IV discusses lower-cost 
strategies for implementing regulatory powers. Sec-
tions V and VI explores alternative methods of achiev-
ing public health compliance outside of the courtroom, 
including conﬂict resolution and public-private coop-
eration, followed by the conclusions. 
II. Public Health Regulation of Persons  
and Businesses
Public health agencies typically possess an array of 
regulatory powers needed to implement health and 
safety standards within society. The regulatory mech-
anisms apply both to persons and businesses. 
Regulation of Persons 
In OECD countries, public health officials tradition-
ally have held a variety of powers to control personal 
behavior for the prevention of communicable disease 
transmission. These regulatory measures include 
screening, reporting, treatment, vaccination, isola-
tion, and quarantine. 
Different countries vary in how far the law goes in 
mandating these measures. In some nations, measures 
such as screening and vaccination are completely vol-
untary; in other nations, these measures can be com-
pulsory. Still other nations seek to ﬁnd a middle ground 
between these two extremes. The Canadian govern-
ment, for example, encourages vaccination by making 
public services conditional upon it; in Canada (as in 
many OECD countries), parents must present proof of 
their child’s vaccination in order to register their child 
for public school.7 Such a method impels compliance 
with public health norms without infringing on civil 
liberties. Vaccinations, as a regulatory mechanism, are 
considered one of the most cost-effective and widely 
used public health interventions against infectious 
diseases. 
Screening and reporting are useful methods to 
identify disease within a population and enable subse-
quent control measures for the protection of the pub-
lic’s health.8 The use of this mechanism can range from 
compulsory to fully voluntary (upon request), with 
intermediate gradations. For example, OECD coun-
tries typically mandate screening of schoolchildren or 
health workers for speciﬁc diseases (e.g., tuberculosis) 
as a condition of school or work. 
Another common regulatory mechanism in the 
OECD countries is the mandatory treatment of per-
sons diagnosed with an infectious disease. Public 
health statutes may authorize public health officials to 
require treatment of individuals “if they pose a signiﬁ-
cant risk of transmission and the treatment is beneﬁ-
cial.”9 If a public health agency seeks to compel treat-
ment adherence, it will often go through a process of 
escalating control measures whereby the use of more 
stringent measures must be justiﬁed based on public 
health need. 
Two other common public health mechanisms 
are isolation and quarantine, which both involve the 
detention of persons but for different reasons. Isola-
tion detains people who are known to have a commu-
nicable disease whereas quarantine detains asymp-
tomatic people who are suspected to have a disease 
due to exposure. During the SARS and Inﬂuenza (A) 
H1N1 outbreaks, for example, countries used quaran-
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tines in a variety of settings (e.g., home, work, hospi-
tal) with different levels of coercion or enforcement. 
Regulation of Business 
Public health officials in the OECD countries also 
possess the ability to regulate businesses, including 
occupational health and safety, emission standards, 
hygiene, and sanitation. Such powers are critical to 
ensure that businesses behave in a safe and competent 
manner and do not create undue health risks. Regula-
tory powers include: licensing of trades, professions, 
and institutions; inspecting for violations of health 
and safety standards; and abating public nuisances.
Licenses are used to allow a business (or a profes-
sion) to engage in an activity that would otherwise be 
barred by law, and it typically requires the demonstra-
tion of proﬁciency in that activity. Public health agen-
cies often utilize this mechanism to protect the public’s 
health or safety through the requirement that certain 
standards are met in the performance of an activity. 
For example, OECD countries often issue licenses to 
qualiﬁed individuals in the practice of professions 
(e.g., doctors) as well as businesses in the operation of 
establishments (e.g., restaurants).10 
Inspections are another useful mechanism that 
can be used to monitor and enforce compliance with 
health and safety standards in businesses. An inspec-
tion is an official investigation or oversight — a for-
mal and careful examination of a product, business, or 
premises to ascertain its authenticity, quality, or con-
dition. This mechanism is often utilized in the OECD 
countries to determine whether conditions exist that 
are deleterious to health and safety and thereby vio-
late public health standards or rules.
In many jurisdictions — particularly those that 
derive from the common law legal system — public 
health officials can use the law of public nuisance to 
address potential health threats and poor safety stan-
dards. The deﬁnition of public nuisance tends to be 
quite broad; for example, under U.S. law, it includes 
anything injurious to health. Nuisances can range 
from “matters of signiﬁcant annoyance to conditions 
that impose signiﬁcant risks to health and safety,” 
which include scenarios where businesses (or even 
private individuals) create pollution, contamination, 
or infestation.11
This article focuses primarily on approaches to the 
regulation of businesses.
III. Traditional Methods of Regulation
Traditional methods of implementing public health 
regulations include mechanisms for monitoring, 
inducing compliance, and “punishing” non-com-
pliance. The most common methods are through 
searches, inspection, and licensing. These forms of 
“traditional regulation” have a long-established his-
tory in the OECD countries.12 
Administrative Searches and Inspections 
Administrative inspections can be used to enforce 
public health standards. For a minor violation, the 
health agency might respond with a formal notice of 
health violation, but for more serious violations, the 
agency might go so far as to close the business. Many 
countries impose minimum inspection requirements 
on licensed individuals and companies. In Ireland, 
public health law mandates health and environmental 
inspections at least once per year. Regular inspections 
are costly, but save health resources in the long term 
by maintaining high public health standards and pre-
venting hazardous practices.13 
There are a few types of administrative inspection 
that public health agencies can perform. The simplest 
“walk-through” inspection provides a quick assess-
ment of a facility, in which the public health inspector 
can observe operational practices, make sure that basic 
public health standards are being met, and check that 
records are being kept.14 Walk-through inspections 
can be a simple way of maintaining compliance with 
health laws because the inspection makes the pres-
ence of the public health authority felt by the com-
pany, which tends to induce compliance. A detailed 
compliance assessment is a more thorough inspection 
of records, interviews with staff, and examination of 
self-monitoring practices. In cases of non-compliance, 
the agency would collect evidence of public health vio-
lations, which could later be used as evidence in litiga-
tion.15 A ﬁnal type of inspection is a sampling inspec-
tion, which can be expensive and time-consuming, as 
many forms of sampling require more tools, scientiﬁc 
expertise, and resources. These could be difficult for 
many local public health agencies in some develop-
ing countries. Other forms of sampling can be fairly 
simple, such as testing salt for iodine content. 
There are two main difficulties with inspections. 
First, government inspections call into question the 
fundamental civil liberties of some cultures. In the 
U.S., citizens enjoy a constitutional right to be pro-
tected from “unreasonable search and seizure,” which 
is meant to ensure that citizens have the right to be 
secure in their own property. This constitutional right 
creates certain boundaries that government inspec-
tions may not infringe upon. Nevertheless, inspec-
tions span the entire ﬁeld of public health-related 
law, ensuring the safe construction and maintenance 
of buildings or residences, purity of food and drugs, 
sanitary condition of farms or restaurants, safe work-
place environments, and control of pesticides and 
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toxic emissions. The U.K. deals with individual rights 
by placing ﬁrm limits on the government’s right to 
inspection. Inspections are often limited to “reason-
able hours” or “with notice,” or to particular hours of 
the day. Inspection powers, however, are still signiﬁ-
cant because they allow for entry without a warrant 
when inspections are conducted for the purposes of 
public health protection.16 
The second difficulty is that inspections can be an 
expensive form of regulation. Inspections take sig-
niﬁcant time, require trained workers, and can be 
subject to graft. All three problems risk being exacer-
bated in developing countries where resources are at 
a premium. 
Licenses 
Licensing can be a highly effective approach to reg-
ulating potentially unsafe behavior. This approach 
serves a two-fold purpose in public health regulation. 
First, a licensing system — by requiring proof of com-
petence and compliance with minimum standards 
— can sift out the unqualiﬁed business and unsafe 
practices. Second, through inspections and sanctions 
for violators, licensing offers continuous public health 
monitoring and supervision. In the OECD coun-
tries, licensure generally allows ﬂexible enforcement 
by public health officials. For example, in Australia, 
health officers who detect poor hygiene by a food ven-
dor have several options: prosecution, a default notice, 
or a “clean up” order. In some states within Australia, 
such as New South Wales, failure to comply with the 
ﬁrst order may lead to a second order that would pro-
hibit the sale, handling, or manufacture of food on the 
premises.17 Similarly, in the U.S., the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) can issue a license suspension 
that is “effective immediately, with a right of hearing 
only upon the ﬁrm’s request for reinstatement under 
a new permit.”18 These strategies allow agencies to 
respond ﬂexibly to health threats. 
Though the licensing system provides many ben-
efits, there may be drawbacks for the developing 
world. Despite licensure’s ﬂexibility and effectiveness, 
it can be an “administratively expensive and cumber-
some enforcement tool.”19 This is of particular concern 
where agencies are chronically short of funds (and/or 
licensing procedures are unnecessarily cumbersome 
and transaction-intensive) because proper monitor-
ing can easily be pushed aside in favor of expediency 
and graft. In creating a licensing system, governments 
must be careful not to set unrealistic administrative 
demands on local agencies. Without adequate fund-
ing and oversight, a licensing system can be ineffective 
and even lead to abuse. 
Another problem is that, in some developing coun-
tries, underpaid government officials can be tempted 
to use licenses as a tool for extortion.20 Most OECD 
countries have built, over many years, a series of inter-
nal checks on government authority 
(such as a public complaint process, 
public ombudsmen, administrative 
review, and judicial oversight) to 
address such problems. Citizens who 
feel that they have been harassed 
by government authorities have 
recourse through a variety of struc-
tures. In countries that dedicate fewer 
resources to checking government 
authority, concerns about harass-
ment can be substantial, and careful 
measures need to be put in place to enhance transpar-
ency and accountability in the regulatory process.
IV. Overcoming the Limits of  
Traditional Regulation 
The administration and enforcement of public health 
regulations are highly resource intensive tasks that 
can be difficult for developing countries due to lim-
ited agency capacities, poorly designed procedures 
for regulatory implementation, and unreliable judi-
cial systems. Although traditional mechanisms such 
as licensing and inspections are vital to public health, 
many OECD agencies have started to supplement 
these methods with less cumbersome and expensive 
approaches in recent years. In particular, agencies have 
adopted the use of formal notice, public disclosure, 
and cascading sanctions to lower costs and improve 
compliance. Such approaches to reducing the costs of 
regulatory implementation might be useful for devel-
oping countries to adapt to their own circumstances.
Formal Notice 
Written notices of health violations offer a highly 
cost-effective way to enforce health regulations. These 
notices are usually simple; their job, in the words of one 
U.S. FDA manager, is to tell the company to “knock it 
off!” More formally, the FDA describes a warning letter 
as “a legally signiﬁcant notice...by the FDA, that a per-
In creating a licensing system, governments must 
be careful not to set unrealistic administrative 
demands on local agencies. Without adequate 
funding and oversight, a licensing system can be 
ineffective and even lead to abuse. 
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son is believed to be in violation of laws or regulations 
enforced by the FDA.”21 Since warning letters do not 
carry any force of law, they do not require any official 
collection of data by the health agency. If the company 
in question feels that it has done nothing wrong, they 
can dialogue with the agency in an attempt to resolve 
the problem. But the warning letter serves as notice 
that the agency believes there is a violation and that if 
the company does not change its behavior, legal action 
could follow. Warning letters also serve the alternative 
purpose of establishing evidence for any future trials 
that a person’s or company’s actions were taken “in 
deﬁance of well-understood proscriptions.”22 
The FDA has found that written notices can be 
a particularly effective way to induce compliance 
with health regulations and standards, especially 
when used in conjunction with public disclosure (see 
below). For example, the FDA can issue a warning let-
ter to an offending company that is suspected of sell-
ing a misbranded drug. As a next step, the FDA can 
threaten legal action or public disclosure in exchange 
for the company’s agreement to remedy the problem. 
A recent example of the simplicity of the FDA’s use of 
this strategy occurred in 2006 when the FDA began 
requiring food companies to list trans fat content sep-
arately on the Nutrition Facts panel of all packaged 
foods. Though the FDA does not regulate trans fat 
in foods, the simple act of informing companies that 
their products would be displayed as containing trans 
fat content was enough to induce change in a num-
ber of companies. These companies reduced the trans 
fat content in their products to below the minimum 
amount per serving so that they could they could label 
their products “trans fat free” on the packaging. 
Public Disclosure
Public disclosure is an efficient and straightforward 
way of enforcing compliance with public health regu-
lations. Public health agencies can require companies 
to give them information on certain activities (such as 
pollution levels) and then release that information to 
the public. The resulting public pressure on the com-
pany (or even the threat of public pressure) has been 
“surprisingly effective” in achieving regulatory goals 
without coercion.23 Public disclosure can take the form 
of product labeling, health warnings, conﬂict of inter-
est statements, health outcomes data, adverse event 
reporting, and product safety information. 
There are many potential uses of public disclosure. 
The threat of public disclosure can compel companies 
to change product design, since the threat of disclosing 
harmful ingredients often makes companies nervous 
enough to improve their product. Or public disclosure 
can be used to encourage honest dealings. In the U.S., 
the FDA requires drug companies to disclose all ﬁnan-
cial transactions made between the company and any 
clinical investigators. Public disclosure can caution 
consumers about the hazards of products and educate 
consumers about safe uses of those products. It can 
encourage safer professional practices by helping the 
public to monitor health behavior; public disclosure 
of the performance of physicians, hospitals, and man-
aged health-care plans provide a good example of this 
tool. Public disclosure can even be used as a lower-cost 
(though less effective) way of conducting an inspec-
tion, since asking for the information in itself may 
induce the sort of improvements that inspections are 
meant to compel. 
Public disclosure can be a powerful way of increasing 
administrative authority at low cost, and without impos-
ing on civil liberties. The public health agency need not 
coerce nor waste valuable resources; it simply brings 
information out into the light of public scrutiny where 
public opinion can pressure companies into reforming 
their behavior. Unlike some forms of regulation, there is 
little political backlash from public disclosure. In most 
OECD countries, consumers and patients are thought 
to have an undisputed right to be fully informed in 
making their public health decisions. Public disclosure 
does not compel companies to alter products or design; 
it merely increases transparency to potential consum-
ers. Finally, the low costs of public disclosure make it a 
useful mechanism for developing countries facing lim-
ited agency capacity. Because it does not increase moni-
toring costs, public disclosure is a low-cost approach to 
Licenses and inspections are more effective enforcement mechanisms,  
but also more expensive to administer. Written notices and public disclosure 
are less costly to use, but they are impotent without a credible threat of real 
sanctions. Thus, the most effective way to use these approaches is 
 in combination as a “cascading hierarchy of sanctions.” 
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public health regulation that can be implemented by 
developing country governments. 
A Cascading Hierarchy of Sanctions 
All of these implementation strategies have their 
strengths and weaknesses. Licenses and inspections 
are more effective enforcement mechanisms, but also 
more expensive to administer. Written notices and pub-
lic disclosure are less costly to use, but they are impo-
tent without a credible threat of real sanctions. Thus, 
the most effective way to use these approaches is in 
combination as a “cascading hierarchy of sanctions.” 
In a cascading hierarchy of sanctions, the public 
health agency addresses a public health problem in 
a series of steps, to induce compliance with minimal 
resort to the more extreme measures. The ﬁrst step 
usually takes the form of a voluntary measure. In the 
case of a food vendor practicing improper hygiene, the 
ﬁrst step would be simply to explain to the vendor how 
to improve food hygiene. If the matter is not resolved 
within a speciﬁc period, the agency moves on to the 
next step, issuing a formal notice, asking the vendor 
to remedy the situation. Such a notice would state the 
speciﬁcs of the violation and make it clear that if the 
vendor does not remedy their practices, more severe 
action will follow. If again, the matter is not resolved, 
the agency responds by imposing a ﬁne and sending a 
second notice demanding that the agent remedy the 
situation. If the vendor still fails to rectify the prob-
lem, then the agency should make the issue public by 
forcing the restaurant to publicly disclose its sanita-
tion practices and any risks to the public’s health. 
Finally, only as a last resort, would the agency take the 
administratively expensive steps of formal inspection, 
withdrawing the vendor’s license, or prosecuting the 
vendor. 
At any of these stages, the vendor can appeal against 
perceived harassment by taking his complaints to 
an ombudsman or mediator. The judiciary becomes 
involved only if the vendor decides to appeal to the 
court as a last resort. But, even here, the vendor is 
deterred from this. In the course of dealing with the 
vendor, the public health agency has accumulated a 
large amount of formal evidence. This evidence will 
make successful prosecution of the case a much sim-
pler matter and the vendor will likely be deterred from 
attempting to litigate the issue since he is unlikely to 
win. This strategy not only minimizes the number 
of resources that must be immediately committed 
to combat a standard public health violation; it also 
minimizes the chances that the case will come before 
a court. The administrative agency is able to take a 
number of escalating steps — none of them very costly 
— that can address the restaurant’s behavior at a mini-
mal cost to both parties. 
Of course, these simpler measures work better if 
backed by a credible threat of sanctions in the case of 
repeated noncompliance. Unfortunately, the ultimate 
threat is often that of judicial action, which can lack 
credibility if the process is slow and unpredictable. 
The next section discusses some alternate approaches 
to judicial action.
V. Efficient Conﬂict Resolution 
Overcrowded and inefficient courts are not a prob-
lem unique to the developing world. In many OECD 
countries, legal dockets are over-crowded, with long 
case backlogs and underfunded government prosecu-
tors. As a result, public health agencies have begun to 
employ non-judicial techniques to resolve disputes 
arising in public health administration. These tech-
niques usually involve less costly and time-consuming 
processes than do court cases. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an approach 
that attempts to settle disputes outside of the gov-
ernment judicial system. It relies on methods such 
as negotiation, mediation, or arbitration to resolve 
disputes between parties. Arbitration and mediation 
accomplish many of the same objectives as a stan-
dard court trial, but provide some added beneﬁts in 
increased efficiency. Arbitration is similar to a stan-
dard legal trial; however, instead of the case being 
heard by a judge and conducted according to the for-
mal rules of the legal system, the dispute is argued 
in a less formal setting and decided by a mutually 
acceptable arbiter (often an expert in the ﬁeld). Such 
disputes are typically resolved more quickly and with 
less expense than a standard court trial. And since 
both sides have explicitly agreed to be bound by the 
arbiter’s decision, there is generally less dissatisfaction 
with the outcome. 
Like arbitration, mediation is a more cost- and 
time-effective means to settling a dispute. In media-
tion, the parties to a given dispute gather and negoti-
ate (with the help of a mediator) a mutually accept-
able resolution to the dispute. Mediation provides the 
added beneﬁt of encouraging compromise and mutual 
understanding among parties, a fact which often leads 
to better relations and fewer recurrences of conﬂict. 
A recent dispute in Germany is representative of 
alternative dispute resolution’s growing role in OECD 
health and environmental conﬂicts. In the tiny village 
of Münchehagen in Lower Saxony, local citizens and 
the district public health agency became concerned 
about a hazardous waste landﬁll. It was suspected 
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that local industry (aided by a lax municipal author-
ity) was responsible for illegal dumping in the landﬁll, 
which led to the contamination of the village’s soil and 
water and was posing a danger to public health.24 Con-
ﬂict over the landﬁll arose between the local citizens 
and the district public health agency on one side and 
local industry on the other side, but the parties agreed 
to resolve their dispute through mediation. A public 
health official trained in mediation was brought in 
from a neighboring province to help resolve the dis-
pute, and this led to mediation negotiations involving 
representatives from local authorities, environmen-
tal organizations, state government, and concerned 
members of the public. The procedure was ﬁnanced 
by the health and environmental agency which agreed 
to keep the public regularly informed about the nego-
tiations. These negotiations are felt to be a strong suc-
cess story on the power of mediation as numerous 
agreements have been reached on questions of tech-
nology and the extent of the clean-up and the com-
mittees have continued to meet afterwards to moni-
tor implementation and discuss future issues. Perhaps 
most importantly, mediation has been a much cheaper 
option than a standard court trial, saving the parties 
vast sums of time and attorney fees.25 
Austria has been a pioneer in encouraging mediation 
in public health and environmental conﬂicts. In some 
cases, local public authorities may suspend general 
administrative procedures in order to conduct media-
tion. According to a study by the Austrian Society for 
Environment and Technology, the beneﬁts of these 
mediation proceedings were impressive. Most media-
tion proceedings were concluded within one year. For 
larger projects, the costs of mediation were estimated 
at .01% of the total project cost; for small projects, 
the costs were between 1-10% percent. The mediation 
costs were borne either by the party responsible for 
the project, or jointly by government bodies.26 
Such success stories have led to the growing use of 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in OECD 
public health agencies. Alternative dispute resolution 
is perhaps the fastest growing trend in administrative 
law today.27 In New South Wales, Australia, the Health 
Commission provides mediation programs that divert 
disputes away from the litigation system.28 In France, 
government and scholars both promote alternative dis-
pute resolution as a means of “relieving the burden of 
the courts, and resolving disputes in a faster, simpler, 
and cheaper manner.”29 In administrative disputes in 
particular, mediation has become an increasingly fre-
quent approach to resolving conﬂicts between admin-
istrators and businesses or persons. Even in Germany, 
where “virtually all major (environmental and health) 
disputes until recently ended up in court,” the trend 
towards alternative dispute resolution has increased, 
as both companies and local NGOs have realized the 
economic and social beneﬁts.30 
Alternative dispute resolution is not by any means 
a strictly Western construct. In fact, alternative dis-
pute resolution is experiencing rapid growth in Asia, 
where many countries have been quick to realize the 
gains in legal efficiency and effectiveness that alterna-
tive dispute resolution can bring.31 The China Interna-
tional Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission 
has administered more international arbitration cases 
than any other institution in the world over the past 
few years. But international alternative dispute reso-
lution’s growth in China has organic roots, as China 
has enacted sweeping reforms and updates to its alter-
native dispute resolution system, allowing it to play a 
larger role in domestic law. Under the new reforms, 
“domestic arbitration is to be handled by commissions 
established at the municipal level which are inde-
pendent of and not subordinate to any government 
or administrative body.”32 In this new system, each 
local arbitration commission is a member of the newly 
formed China Arbitration Association, an indepen-
dent organization that supervises its own arbitrators 
and provides a set of model procedural rules.33 
Like many non-traditional approaches to regulation, 
alternative dispute resolution has signiﬁcant potential 
in developing countries. Alternative dispute resolu-
tion is much cheaper than adjudication through the 
traditional legal system where long, expensive trials 
can cause both sides of the dispute to end up worse-off 
than before. Furthermore, alternative dispute resolu-
tion provides a better opportunity for both parties to 
walk away on cordial and mutually beneﬁcial terms 
than the adversarial court system (where it is rare that 
a court ruling will satisfy all parties to the conﬂict). 
It may also dovetail with local practices: for exam-
ple, historically, in common law countries, a panel of 
industry experts familiar with standard practices and 
dealings often helped settle business disputes.34 
Ombudsmen 
Many OECD countries have agency Ombudsmen 
whose job is to act as a trusted intermediary between 
the people and government agencies. These Ombuds-
men serve a watchdog role to identify government 
abuses and act in a “mediator-like” capacity to negoti-
ate differences. Ombudsmen cannot be removed from 
office, a fact that enables them to represent the people 
in disputes with government, while insulating them 
from political pressures. 
The U.K.’s Health Service Ombudsman is typical of 
the kind of intermediary that OECD nations employ 
to guard against agency abuses. In recent years, the 
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U.K. Health Service Ombudsman has brought cases 
against government missteps on diverse issues such 
as environmental violations, and the discriminatory 
distribution of health services. Many of these cases 
have resulted in improved health administration. For 
example, in 2003, the Health Service Ombudsman 
brought a case against the government for denying 
health services to certain disabled and elderly citi-
zens after receiving numerous complaints. The gov-
ernment eventually agreed to pay out a large sum in 
restitution and promised to review its actions and 
take greater precautions to avoid repeating the same 
mistake.35 
Most OECD countries have an Ombudsman or 
mediator capable of confronting the government over 
perceived abuses. These Ombudsmen play an impor-
tant role in making sure that citizens’ public health 
complaints are heard. In Ireland, for example, 14% 
of complaints related to public health.36 Some OECD 
countries, such as Norway, have specialized “Health 
Ombudsmen” whose job is to watch over public health 
abuses. To prevent the Ombudsman from being over-
burdened, each of Norway’s regional governments 
has its own Ombudsmen to watch over public health 
and social affairs in that region. These Ombudsmen 
can take a case either at their own initiative or at the 
request of an interested party.37 
Ombudsmen could have an important role in devel-
oping countries. Where judicial processes are slow and 
erratic, public health administration is difficult, but so 
is recourse against administrative abuses.38 If courts 
cannot prosecute quickly or efficiently, the common 
citizen has even less of a chance of efficient resolution. 
Mistaken or oppressive government actions escape 
scrutiny and civil liberties can be lost.39 It is therefore 
important that developing countries, like developed 
ones, have a strong, independent Ombudsmen or 
mediators to protect these civil liberties watch against 
government neglect or abuse. 
VI. Public-Private Cooperation
Industries operate to maximize proﬁts, and this goal 
can conflict with public health objectives. Hence, 
the control of businesses is a critical issue for public 
health agencies. This, unfortunately, seems like an 
impossible task for health agencies faced with limited 
administrative capacity and the inability to prosecute 
these companies in court. An alternative solution 
that has surfaced in recent years is the use of public-
private cooperation. In this case, health agencies try 
to collaborate with the private sector in drafting and 
implementing public health policies (or objectives) 
together. This method, although imperfect, provides 
a practical means through which public health agen-
cies can achieve their objectives in resource poor 
governments. 
Negotiated Rulemaking
Negotiated rulemaking is “a voluntary process to 
promote interactive participation in drafting regula-
tions.”40 Sometimes known as regulatory negotiation 
or “reg-neg,” negotiated rulemaking has been effective 
in settings where government faces limitation in regu-
lating public health violations. By changing the tra-
ditional roles from that of regulator and regulatee to 
a more complex relationship, in which the interested 
parties negotiate collectively the text of a proposed 
rule, this approach can be less adversarial than tradi-
tional regulation.41 The negotiators make trade-offs, 
evaluate priorities, and come to understand the posi-
tion of the other parties.42 
For example, in the Netherlands, the Rotterdam city 
government contracts with companies upriver to stop 
polluting the Rhine River. Since the city is situated in 
an “end-of-pipe” position at the estuary of the Rhine 
River where toxic material is dumped in the river by 
upstream industries, the Rotterdam government has 
negotiated environmental “covenants” with the Dutch, 
German, and French upriver polluters to stem pollu-
tion. According to these contracts, the government 
agrees to a certain attitude toward the environmen-
tal conduct of the other private party (e.g., to refrain 
An alternative solution that has surfaced in recent years is the use of  
public-private cooperation. In this case, health agencies try to collaborate with 
the private sector in drafting and implementing public health policies  
(or objectives) together. This method, although imperfect, provides  
a practical means through which public health agencies can achieve  
their objectives in resource poor governments. 
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from imposing further regulations upon the company) 
while the private party agrees to limit or refrain from 
polluting. The government acts as a private party 
under these contracts and waives the right to sue the 
company over damages caused by pollution into the 
public harbor. Essentially, the government assumes a 
role that is akin to that of a manager of the harbor and 
negotiates a fair agreement with polluters.43 
The upshot of such an agreement is that the gov-
ernment spends fewer resources policing the indus-
try. Ideally, negotiated rulemaking will transform the 
relationship between government and industry from 
one of mutual suspicion and hostility to one of greater 
cooperation. When companies or persons are given a 
seat at the negotiating table, there is an opportunity to 
reach a mutually agreeable arrangement and, hence, 
these actors are more likely to comply with the ensu-
ing agreement. Through this process, the government 
learns to better understand industry’s concerns and 
is able to design a health policy that lessens harm-
ful practices while trying to accommodate industry 
needs. The beneﬁts of negotiated rulemaking include: 
reduced time and resources in required for the devel-
opment of rules, faster implementation of those rules, 
greater compliance, less litigation, and more coopera-
tive relationships.44 In addition, in locations where 
human and ﬁnancial regulatory resources are limited, 
there may be practical beneﬁts in the cooption of pri-
vate expertise. 
Critics of regulatory negotiations assert that negoti-
ated rulemaking may lead the agency to “abandon its 
role as the guardian of the public interest by yielding 
to the interests of powerful stakeholders.”45 This is a 
valid concern as there are situations where traditional 
forms of government regulation, free from private sec-
tor inﬂuence, are necessary. Public health agencies 
must strive to establish and implement regulations 
that protect the public’s health as its foremost con-
cern. Nevertheless, there is a strong argument for use 
of regulatory negotiations in the developing world in 
some situations for the sake of health progress at the 
cost of minimal trade-offs rather than an absolutely 
intractable state. 
Self-Regulation
Self-regulation is another technique that public health 
agencies can use to encourage and improve compli-
ance without signiﬁcant expenditures. This approach 
is intended, in principle, to be a voluntary means of 
achieving cooperative action without direct state 
intervention; although, in practice, external interven-
tion is often involved.46 In the OECD countries, self-
regulation has been applied for public health purposes 
in a variety of areas ranging from advertising to worker 
and product safety, environmental management, and 
ﬁre prevention. These forms of self-regulation are use-
ful, to some extent, in improving public health.
There are three primary approaches to self-regu-
lation: voluntary self-regulation, whereby standards 
formulation and enforcement are conducted privately; 
mandated full self-regulation, whereby regulation is 
privatized, but the government monitors and, in some 
cases, intervenes in enforcement to ensure compli-
ance; and mandated partial self-regulation, whereby 
the government either enforces compliance with pri-
vate standards or mandates the private enforcement of 
public rules.47 The use of the self-regulatory approach 
can take the forms of codes of conduct, industry stan-
dards, accreditation, and ratings,48 and public officials 
need to work in concert with self-regulating agencies 
to draft these.
Codes of conduct set out speciﬁc standards of con-
duct for an industry which dictate what is acceptable 
and required behavior.49 For example, Medicines Aus-
tralia is a self-regulatory industry association that 
sets the standards for the ethical marketing of phar-
maceutical products in Australia.50 Effective codes 
of conduct improve compliance with regulation and 
increase consumer protection at a minimal cost to the 
government. Companies receive several beneﬁts from 
complying with such codes: greater transparency 
among the industry; improved investor conﬁdence 
in the business; a competitive marketing advantage; 
and a greater sense of ownership of the code leading 
to a stronger commitment.51 Such codes of conduct 
may not be as stringent as direct government regula-
tion, but they are a vast improvement on the non-exis-
tent government regulation that sometimes exists in 
developing countries. As such, codes of conduct have 
become increasingly common in many nations. By 
protecting against false claims and improper relation-
ships between drug companies and health care profes-
sionals, these codes preempt marketing practices that 
might harm public health. 
Another form of quality control is mandated by the 
government, but carried out by the regulated party 
or another private entity. An example of this model is 
employed in Germany, where blood banks are required 
to test donated blood for diseases that can be transmit-
ted by transfusion. If a unit of blood is unsafe, it can-
not be distributed and the donor must be notiﬁed.52 
Another method of self-regulation is for indus-
try to create minimum standards in product design 
that companies must comply with in order to receive 
accreditation. Accreditation is similar to licensing, but 
instead of the government monitoring and issuing 
licenses, a private organization (such as an industry 
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association) issues credentials to companies that meet 
a speciﬁed set of design or safety standards.53 
Through measures such as licensing or accredita-
tion, self-regulation associations can exert a large 
impact on industry compliance with public health 
objectives; specifically, standards of competence, 
safety, or design. In addition, the negative publicity 
of losing such accreditation provides a major incen-
tive for these companies to conform to industry stan-
dards. Government sanctions, in some instances, can 
give self-regulation the force of law. For example, if a 
hospital wishes to participate in a U.S. government 
health-care program, it must be accredited by the 
Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals, 
a self-regulatory body.54 Self-regulation also provides 
many of the same advantages of negotiated rulemak-
ing. Well-constructed industry self-regulation can 
provide for speedy implementation, greater ﬂexibil-
ity, less burden on government, and reduced political 
opposition.55 
Examples of industry self-regulation in OECD coun-
tries are abundant. For example, in the U.S., associa-
tions representing the alcohol industry require adver-
tising to reach an audience composed of more than 
50 percent adults.56 As children’s health issues have 
come to dominate public health discourse in recent 
years, the American Beverage Association issued 
guidelines to remove the sale of full-calorie soft drinks 
in schools,57 while ﬁve large snack food manufactur-
ers agreed to an initiative to discourage schools from 
stocking vending machines with unhealthy foods.58 In 
Canada, a self-regulating organization — Advertis-
ing Standards Canada (ASC) — compels responsible 
advertising from food and beverage companies.59 
Private companies can, in certain situations, be 
effective regulators. Wealthy companies and institu-
tions have more resources with which to monitor and 
regulate other industry members. What is more, it is 
in their economic and competitive interest to do so. 
If a particular company proﬁts by breaking the rules, 
then those compliant companies who are abiding by 
the rules are not only well-situated to discover this foul 
play, and these companies have every reason to band 
together to put a halt to this undesirable practice.
Finally, ratings, like accreditation, can be used by 
public health agencies to pressure companies into 
conforming to public health and safety standards. 
Privately run independent organizations, such as the 
U.S.’s Consumer Reports, publish unbiased ratings 
and reports on everything from automobile safety to 
drug safety, create ratings to encourage companies to 
produce safer products for consumers and, in conse-
quence, protect the public’s health.60 
Self-regulation has many advantages, especially in 
terms offering a lower-cost alternative to traditional 
forms of regulation. However, there are many ﬂaws 
in this policy. Self-inspection is a shaky solution even 
in OECD countries with a long tradition of self-reg-
ulation. In some developing countries, a system of 
self-inspections risks turning self-regulation into no 
regulation without some government oversight. Self-
regulation is not meant to entirely remove the threat 
of monitoring or inspections, because some moni-
toring is still needed. The government should retain 
this power. But by encouraging strong self-regulating 
agencies, the government can lessen its regulatory 
burden by delegating some of this work to an inde-
pendent institution. 
Public-Private Cooperation in Designing and 
Implementing Public Health Laws
The inclusion of a wide array of participants in the 
public health law development process is pivotal. Par-
ticipants such as the community, civil society organi-
zations, and private businesses can provide valuable, 
and perhaps unforeseen, advice and input. It is also 
important to include other sectors (such as the agen-
cies for environment, safety, emergency relief, etc.) in 
order to achieve synergistic policies that will help to 
beneﬁt public health and other areas for the common 
good. By allowing local groups to provide a hand in 
the negotiation and establishment of new health stan-
dards, public health agencies can both improve com-
pliance and help to soften the wave of often tumultuous 
changes that globalization carries to these societies.
Transparency is another key factor to the effec-
tive implementation of public health laws. The use of 
public announcements, open forums (e.g., town halls 
and community gatherings), and public comment ses-
sions (e.g., requests for information) are mechanisms 
that can help dispel potential concerns of suspicion or 
mystiﬁcation that might surround the development of 
public health laws. Transparency will foster trust, con-
ﬁdence, and appreciation in the efforts of public health 
agencies, which will be crucial for public and private 
cooperation during the implementation phase. 
VII. Conclusions
There are a number of ways to reduce the costs of 
assuring compliance with public health standards. 
This article sought to shed light on various OECD 
approaches to this problem through a review of tra-
ditional and innovative legal mechanisms, which help 
implement public health regulations at lower cost, 
with greater transparency, and reduce dependence on 
the judiciary. The suggestions here are not intended 
to provide a one-size-ﬁts-all solution to public health 
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regulation in the developing world. Developing 
countries build from their own unique institutional 
foundations; they operate in the context of differing 
political atmospheres; and they face their own sets of 
problems. The mechanisms suggested here, such as 
mediation or negotiated rule-making, might be par-
ticularly well-suited for some purposes where they can 
tap into strong traditions of community rule-making, 
while the mainstream incentive-based forms of regu-
lation might be more applicable for most other pur-
poses. Essentially, these approaches will have to be 
adapted as needed to suit the particular health needs, 
institutional contexts, and resource availabilities of 
low-income countries.
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